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ABSTRACT: The philosophical dispute about linguistic normativity is one battlefield in a larger war 
over the nature of language as an object of scientific study. For those influenced by Wittgenstein, 
language involves following — or failing to follow — public, prescriptive rules; for Chomsky and his 
followers, language is a property of individual minds and brains, and the grammatical judgements 
of any mature individual speaker — her competence — cannot be, in any linguistic sense, “wrong”. 
As I argue here, the recent “doge meme” internet fad provides surprising evidence for the 
prescriptivist view. Normative attitudes towards linguistic practices are a ubiquitous feature of those 
practices, and there is no principled basis on which to regard them as non-linguistic. 
KEYWORDS: Chomsky. Doge. I-Language. Normativity. Prescriptivism. 
RESUMO: A disputa filosófica sobre a normatividade linguística é um campo de batalha em uma 
guerra maior sobre a natureza da linguagem como objeto de estudo científico. Para aqueles 
influenciados por Wittgenstein, a linguagem envolve seguir - ou deixar de seguir - regras públicas, 
prescritivas; para Chomsky e seus seguidores, a linguagem é uma propriedade de mentes e cérebros 
individuais, e os julgamentos gramaticais de qualquer falante individual maduro - sua competência 
- não podem ser, em qualquer sentido linguístico, “errados”. Como argumento aqui, a recente moda 
da Internet “meme doge” fornece evidências surpreendentes para a visão prescritivista. Atitudes 
normativas em relação às práticas linguísticas são uma característica onipresente dessas práticas, e 
não há nenhuma base bem fundamentada sobre a qual considerá-las como não linguísticas. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Chomsky. Doge. Língua-I. Normatividade. Prescritivismo. 
 
 
The familiar popular dispute between descriptivists and prescriptivists about 
grammar is — let us not mince words here — a profoundly tiresome and pointless 
one (WALLACE, 2001), which the explosion of opportunities for pedantry afforded 
by the internet has done everything to amplify, and nothing to revivify; I have no 
intention of pursuing it here. But the dispute has roots, or at any rate analogues, 
in some deep issues in theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language; and 
as I shall argue, interesting light is shed on that dispute by a most unlikely online 
phenomenon. 
I begin by summarising the main threads of the philosophical debate about 
normativity in grammar, and the apparent stalemate they have recently issued in. I 
then try to make whatever sense can be made of the wilfully absurd “Doge” meme, 
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before showing how that phenomenon, surprisingly, provides significant evidence 
for the prescriptivist case. 
 
1 
The philosophical dispute about linguistic normativity is one battlefield in a 
larger war over the nature of language as an object of scientific study. According 
to Noam Chomsky and his followers, the popular view of language as a public, 
collective, or abstract entity has no place in a scientific worldview; language is a 
feature of the individual brains of individual speakers. And one consequence of 
this view is that mature speakers cannot be ‘wrong’ in their linguistic judgements 
or practices, by any scientific standard; linguistic should aim to describe the I-
language — the relevant features of individuals’ minds and brains — and the 
behaviour that results from them, and eschew any attempt to evaluate that 
behaviour as proper or improper.  
The radicalism of the I-language or “mentalist” position (ISAC & REISS, 2008, 
p. 12) is often unappreciated. “There is simply no way of making sense of [a notion 
of ‘common, public language’],” writes Chomsky, “… or of any of the work in 
theory of meaning and philosophy of language that relies on such notions” (1995, 
p. 48-49). And lest we thought he was making a narrower claim than he appears 
to be in this statement, he immediately assures us that it “is intended to cut rather 
a large swath” (ibid.). Variations on this theme recur throughout Chomsky’s writing. 
Whereas the I-language is “a real object of the real world” (CHOMSKY, 1993, p. 
39), and “as real as chemical compounds” (CHOMSKY, 1988, p. 679), public 
language (‘E-Language’) is “arbitrary” and “artifactual" (CHOMSKY, 1986, p. 26); 
despite philosophers’ “constant reliance on some notion of ‘community language’ 
or ‘abstract language’, there is virtually no attempt to explain what it might be” 
(CHOMSKY, 1993, p. 39). And public language is “useless for any form of 
theoretical explanation” (CHOMSKY, 1995, p. 48), playing no “role in an eventual 
science of language” (CHOMSKY, 1986, p. 16); we “gain no insight into what 
[language-learners] are doing by supposing that there is a fixed entity that they are 
approaching, even if some sense can be made of this mysterious notion” 
(CHOMSKY, 1992a, p. 17). Any distinctions we might wish to draw between 
different “public languages” are therefore matters of class, politics, or race, rather 
than linguistics; “(p)eople who live near the Dutch border”, he writes, “can 
communicate quite well with people living on the German side, but they speak 
different languages in accordance with the sense of the term [Michael] Dummett 
argues is ‘fundamental’” (CHOMSKY, 1992b, p. 101). 
On Chomsky’s view, then, there are no such entities, abstract or concrete, 
as “public languages”; at most, there are mereological sums of more-or-less 
overlapping particular I-languages, embodied in the brains of particular individuals. 
But these sums play no explanatory or theoretical role in linguistic science, and 
there is no scientific basis for drawing their boundaries in one place rather than 
another. 
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Now, if language is not a property of communities, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
recognised, then there cannot be any question of any individual speaking 
“correctly” or “incorrectly”. If there is no external, community standard by which 
to judge my speech, “whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only 
means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1953, §258). For 
Wittgenstein it followed that, language being normative, its rules must be matters 
of public convention. But one man’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens; for 
Chomsky, it followed that language, being a property of individual minds and 
brains, could not have rules in Wittgenstein’s sense at all (cf. CHOMSKY, 2013, p. 
183).  
It is to this issue, indeed, that we can perhaps trace Chomsky’s introduction 
of the terms I-Language and E-Language. Chomsky had previously distinguished 
between competence and performance; the linguistic knowledge possessed by a 
speaker and the concrete linguistic phenomena they produced as a result. But Saul 
Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations directly 
challenged this terminology; competence, he observed, is “not a dispositional 
notion. It is normative, not descriptive… [it] is dependent on our understanding of 
the idea of ‘following a rule’” (1982, p. 31, fn. 22). “Modern transformational 
linguistics”, as a result, “inasmuch as it explains all my specific utterances by my 
‘grasp’ of syntactic and semantic rules generating infinitely many sentences with 
their interpretation, seems to give an explanation of the type Wittgenstein would 
not permit” (ibid., p. 97, fn. 77). 
So much the worse, then, in Chomsky’s eyes, for Wittgenstein. In his first 
major work following the publication of Kripke’s lectures (which had circulated 
for several years previously) Chomsky not only responds to “Wittgenstein”,2 but 
also replaces the older competence/performance distinction with the new I-
Language/E-Language one. It is in his rejoinder to the Wittgensteinian criticism that 
Chomsky first explicitly denies that there are “rules” of language in any familiar 
sense (CHOMSKY, 1986, p. 688 ff.). Language consists not of normative rules, but 
of purely descriptive principles and parameters for neural and mental organisation, 
and these are to be understood simply as natural, biological features typical to our 
species (ibid.; cf. CHOMSKY, 1995, p. 17).3 The underlying dichotomy presumed 
here between the normative and the natural has been forcefully challenged 
(MILLIKAN, 1995; MILLIKAN, 2003; MILLIKAN, 2005); nevertheless, for Chomsky, 
normativity and prescription “plainly has nothing to do with an eventual science 
                                       
2 It is to the version of Wittgenstein presented by Kripke — often referred to as “Kripkenstein” or 
“Kripke’s Wittgenstein” — that he in fact responds; the consensus view seems to be that this does 
not represent the real Wittgenstein’s position, and Kripke is careful not to assert that it does 
(STEINER, 2011, p. 170, fn. 20). McNally & McNally (2012) provides a useful overview of Chomsky’s 
response. 
3 One notable failure to appreciate the radicalism of Chomsky’s turn here can be found in Devitt 
(2008), whose index contains a single combined entry for “rules (or principles)”, and generally 
treats this as a merely terminological shift, attributing a single position on the status of linguistic 
rules and their mental representation to Chomsky on the basis of both pre- and post-1986 writings 
(e.g. pp. 04; 69; 174-175). But Chomsky has tended to obscure the discontinuity of his views here, 
and I myself have previously overlooked the novelty of the I-Language position (GLACKIN, 2011, 
p. 203; p. 210). 
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of language, but involves other notions having to do with authority, class structure, 
and the like” (CHOMSKY, 1988, p. 675; cf. ISAC & REIS, 2008, ch. 12). 
According to Chomsky, then, language is not the sort of thing mature 
individual users can “get wrong”; at most, we can descriptively state that they fail 
to make themselves understood (CHOMSKY, 2000, p. 07). However, this view not 
only runs counter to those of the great number of philosophers influenced by 
Wittgenstein; it is also at odds with the phenomenology of our language-use. 
It is uncontroversial that we do in fact experience the “rules” of our 
grammar, whether or not we can formulate them explicitly, as having some sort of 
normative pull. “When we hear [‘The child seems sleeping’]”, write the authors of 
a recent pro-Chomsky textbook, “we automatically interpret it as meaning basically 
the same thing as what The child seems to be sleeping means. And yet, it intuitively 
feels like there is something wrong with the structure of the sentence” (ISAC & 
REIS, 2008, p. 83). For Peter Ludlow, elucidating Chomsky’s view, a sentence like 
‘That’s the book that Bill married the woman who illustrated’, while perfectly 
comprehensible, is nevertheless “clearly bad” (2013, p. 06). Maria Teresa Guasti 
tells us, of three-year-old speakers, that “[a]lthough their language may still not be 
perfect, they put words in the correct order” (GUASTI, 2004, p. 02 — emphasis 
added). These clearly normative judgements of acceptability seem ubiquitous 
among language users. Indeed, they constitute the main, perhaps the sole, 
evidence available to linguists in their primary empirical task of reconstructing 
speakers’ I-Languages;4 and Chomsky declares that “a theory of language [which] 
failed to account for these judgements... would plainly be a failure” (1986, p. 37). 
How, then, can it be claimed that language is not normative? 
The key, for anti-prescriptivists, is to distinguish between what the intuitions 
express and the fact that speakers have these intuitions (DEVITT, 2008, p. 119; 
DEVITT & STERELNY, 1989, p. 520-521). The linguist can use these judgements as 
evidence of how the speaker’s I-Language is constructed, without taking their 
content — including its normative aspect — to be true. The normative pull 
experienced by the speaker is thus regarded as a sort of extra-linguistic gilding; we 
are trained to police social, class, and political boundaries through our use of 
language, but this training is not itself a part of language, merely one exclusionary 
use to which language can be put.  
The most detailed development of this response is due to Peter Ludlow. If 
an individual’s grammar is the result of the parameters of Universal Grammar (UG) 
being set during the language acquisition process then he, Ludlow, has the 
grammar GPL as a result of being in parametric state UGPL. We can then distinguish 
between the “language narrowly construed”5 which is generated by his grammar — 
LGPL — and any “other phenomena that we might pre-theoretically take to be 
linguistic, or part of my ‘language’ understood loosely speaking” — LPL (LUDLOW, 
2013, p. 51). Now, sentences may be well-formed according to LGPL, yet still rejected 
                                       
4 For detailed discussion of the controversies over the nature of evidence in linguistics (See DEVITT, 
2008, p. 95 ff.; LUDLOW, 2013, p. 53-54; 64 ff.). 
5 In the sense of Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002) and Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky (2005). 
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by Ludlow as unacceptable — that is, excluded from LPL — owing to non-linguistic 
processing limitations, for instance; he gives the example of ‘The mouse the cat 
the dog bit chased ran away’(ibid.).  
But other extraneous, non-linguistic factors can have a similar effect; if 
Ludlow rejects ‘I ain’t got no money’, it may be because the sentence in fact violates 
LGPL, or because he was “inculcated with prescriptive rules… drilled by grammar 
school teachers not to use “ain’t” and “double negatives”” (ibid., p. 51-52).6 The 
first of these will be a linguistic reason in the strict sense, the second non-linguistic; 
and it may prove exceedingly difficult for linguists to discern which is in play. But 
in either case, there is no reason to think that the normative nature of Ludlow’s 
“surfacey” judgement shows his I-Language — LGPL — to be normative. If the sentence 
does violate LGPL, then that is an interesting linguistic fact about Peter Ludlow and 
the parametric state of his mind/brain, with no bearing on any other individual’s. 
If the aversion is a “drilled”, inculcated one then it turns out, against appearances, 
not to be linguistic at all. 
 
2 
So stand the two sides of the debate, with little sign of movement. As I will 
go on to argue, however, a recent ‘paralinguistic’ phenomenon provides some 
reason to doubt that the response just outlined is satisfactory.7 I will first here 
describe that phenomenon, then go on in the final section of the paper to explain 
the problem it poses for the anti-prescriptivist position. 
The ‘Doge’ meme, an internet fad that became wildly popular during 2013,8 
even spawning its own currency (HERN, 2014) and consequent cybercrime 
(SOUPPOURIS, 2013), consists in its canonical form of a photograph of a Shiba Inu 
dog, surrounded by snippets of interior monologue in brightly-coloured Comic 
Sans.9 The meme attracted a surprising amount of attention from linguists, who 
noted that the snippets had highly distinctive stylistic and grammatical features, to 
the extent “that doge speak is recognizably doge even when it’s not on an image 
at all” (McCULLOUGH, 2014).10  
There are two chief kinds of doge phrase. The first is a one-word 
interjection; usually “wow”, “amaze”, or “excite”. The second consists typically of 
two words, of which the first is usually “such”, “much”, “so”, “very”, or “many”; 
corpus analysis shows that nearly 40% of all doge phrases begin with one of these 
five modifiers (NODAR, 2014). A typical doge utterance will combine at least two 
or three two-word phrases, along with at least one interjection, usually “wow” 
                                       
6 As Ludlow goes on to note, this is not in fact a double negative. 
7 No doubt other such phenomena could illustrate the same point more or less well. However, I 
focus on this one for reasons of both clarity and topicality. 
8 https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=doge&hl=en-US; accessed 5th March, 2019. 
9 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/doge; accessed 5th March, 2019. 
10 McCullough cites one ingenious text-only effort, which begins: ‘What light. So breaks. Such east. 
Very sun. Wow, Juliet.’ 
Shane Nicholas Glackin       113 
SOFIA (ISSN 2317-2339), VITÓRIA (ES), V.8, N.1, P. 108-123, JAN./JUN. 2019 
(McCULLOUGH, 2014). Hybrid types — e.g. “such wow”, “very excite” — are also 
permitted. 
The most distinctive grammatical feature occurs in the two-word phrases, 
and involves “mismatching in the phrasal templates” (GAWNE, 2014), a violation 
of “selectional restriction” (McCULLOUGH, 2014). That is, the modifier must be one 
which would not usually modify a word of the type which follows it. “So” and 
“very”, for example, in standard usage modify only adjectives; in doge speak they 
may modify anything but an adjective. “Very tasty” and “so delicious” are good 
English, but poor doge; “very drink” and “so wine” good doge, but poor English. 
The modified phrase is typically also in its simplest form; hence “amaze” rather 
than “amazed” or “amazing”. Thus, while doge speak looks ungrammatical or 
grammatically primitive, it is neither; it is “built around a very specific grammar 
which users wouldn't be able to use unless they had quite a sophisticated grasp of 
standard English grammar” (CHIVERS, 2014). 
 
3 
All very whimsical and entertaining, but what has any of this to do with I-
Languages and normativity? Quite a lot, as it happens. To say that doge speak is 
‘built around a grammar’ is, for a prescriptivist, to say that doge speak is composed 
of rules, in the normative, Wittgensteinian sense. That is, failure to abide by the 
conventions of the Doge meme is not regarded simply as non-standard or 
idiosyncratic doge speak; it is, precisely, a failure. And we can expect other doge 
users to regard it as such, and to police the rule-following of their interlocutors.  
This is, indeed, what we see; users routinely correct others for using 
constructions that are too conventionally grammatical. Linguist Gretchen 
McCullough (2014) provides a first-hand example:  
Friend #1 (posting link): Doge is a rescue dog. Much respect. So noble. 
Wow. 
Friend #2 (commenting): Your dogeing is too coherent. ‘Much noble, so 
respect.’ 
The most famous case of doge-correction came in December 2013 when 
U.S. Rep. Steve Stockman (R-Texas) tweeted a doge-style image of primary rival 
Sen. John Cornyn, featuring the text “wow. kill GOP filibuster. oppose Ted Cruz. 
support Obamacare funding. don’t like Rand Paul.” The response was swift and 
unequivocal: “It’s hard to explain the doge meme… but it’s definitely not supposed 
to include full, coherent sentences like ‘support Obamacare funding’” 
(LOGIURATO, 2013); “Aside from ‘wow’, the words in the photo are just phrases, 
not doge-isms. Please get it together, Representative” (JONES, 2013); “so correct 
spelling. not any funny. weak attempt. wow.” (ORE, 2013).11 
                                       
11 Note that the complaints here cannot be construed as merely indicating a pragmatic violation (as 
in Ludlow’s ‘mouse/cat/dog’ example); there is no difficulty understanding what Stockman, or 
Friend #1, intended to say in their deviant doge-utterances. 
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Nor was the reaction simply partisan. Both Stockman and fellow Rep. 
Thomas Massie (R-Kentucky) — who had tweeted a Shiba Inu image with the 
caption “Much bipartisanship. Very spending. Wow.” — were criticised for “ruining” 
(McMURRY, 2013), and “killing” (McHugh 2013) the meme by using it for political 
ends. But while both were accused of crass opportunism, Massie escaped 
comparatively lightly; “Stockman’s tweet was targeted”, CBC News explained, “for 
its flagrant use of grammatically correct phrases — something completely against 
the spirit of doge” (ORE, 2013). 
Of course, Chomsky and his allies are well aware that language-users police 
each other’s rule-following; they simply deny that there is anything linguistic about 
this policing. So why should doge speak present any new problems for them? 
Recall that such policing was explained by anti-prescriptivists as being “inculcated” 
and “drilled” into children by parents, teachers, and the general social milieu whose 
non-linguistic strata and divisions language was being used to enforce. That 
explanation is not obviously available in the case of doge speak; its rules are not 
learned injunctions, drilled into new users at the time of their socialisation in a 
particular community. Rather, it looks as though the conventions for using doge 
speak — its “grammar” in the wide, Wittgensteinian sense — simply are themselves 
normative. In other words, at least in one admittedly exotic region of human 
language, normativity is an inherent part of linguistic experience rather than an 
extraneous accompaniment to it. This shifts the onus of proof considerably; it can 
no longer be presumptively the case that language, per se lacks this feature. To 
the contrary, the anti-prescriptivist now owes us an explanation of what, if this 
inherent normativity is not a general feature of language, makes cases such as doge 
speak special. 
Of course, playing “burden tennis” in this way can never be conclusive, and 
there’s an obvious response available here to the I-Language theorist. That is, such 
a theorist can point out that doge speak obviously isn’t governed by the principles 
and parameters of UG. We described it earlier as “paralinguistic”; it uses many of 
the features of the human language faculty, but in a derivative, “piggybacking” 
fashion. But it’s not language; “competence” in doge speak is not part of the 
speaker’s I-Language, and doge speak is not one of the natural human languages 
that a child can acquire as part of the developmental process of first-language 
acquisition which the I-Language theory seeks to explain. So the mere fact that the 
‘grammar’ of doge speak is normative does not show that grammar properly so-
called is. 
There are, I think, two ways to construe this move. One is to treat it as 
demarcating the proper target of linguistic explanation; for some Chomskyans, 
linguistics is properly concerned only with a distinct subset of the phenomena 
generally regarded as “linguistic” (the Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense or 
FLN). So doge is not a linguistic phenomenon sensu stricto, and its normativity 
shows nothing about purported linguistic normativity. I return to this point below. 
The other way of understanding this defense of anti-prescriptivism is to see 
it as drawing a line between admittedly linguistic phenomena on the basis of their 
developmental history; though some linguistic behaviours may be learned in a 
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normatively-laden way, they are “special cases” because the “core” linguistic 
behaviour with which generative linguistics is concerned is acquired by a different, 
and norm-free, process. But this response, I think, misunderstands the nature of 
the challenge. What the normativity of doge speak demonstrates is that norms just 
do for whatever reason phenomenologically accompany (at least some) human 
linguistic (or quasi-, or para-linguistic) behaviour. The developmental history of 
that behaviour is beside the point, that point being that such norms don’t need to 
“come from” anywhere external in order to form part of our linguistic experience 
and behaviour; they may simply arise spontaneously as part of the conditions of 
rule-following in a social context. So there is no reason to think that some 
extraneous source such as indoctrination is necessary to explain the norms which 
accompany canonical cases of grammatical speech, when the phenomenologically 
indistinguishable norms accompanying doge speak can arise without it. 
The anti-prescriptivist again seems to have a persuasive answer available 
here; the phenomenological normativity of language may still be extraneous, but 
ubiquitous. More precisely, the child learning its language is not taught to attach 
class or ethnic evaluations to particular infractions of its linguistic rules. Rather, it 
is taught to take generally class- or ethnicity-sensitive attitudes towards any breach 
of familiar linguistic conventions; but these attitudes are still not, as such, linguistic. 
Thus, because doge speak “piggybacks” on normal language, its users’ normative 
attitudes may likewise piggyback on the extraneously-drilled normative attitudes 
they acquired when they first acquired language. That is, the same extraneous 
drilling accounts for the normative pull of our I-Language and our doge speak 
alike. 
However, this isn’t a solution with which Chomsky and his allies should feel 
comfortable. Universal Grammar was first invoked to explain the ubiquity of certain 
structural features across the grammars of all human languages; by the explicitly 
Cartesian reasoning of the I-Language theorists, a trait universal among humans is 
likely to be innate to humans (CHOMSKY, 1966). The sheer ubiquity of normative 
attitudes to language, therefore, creates a defeasible presumption that those 
attitudes are similarly part of our cognitive and linguistic patrimony. Moreover, 
though I cannot do more than briefly sketch them here, several related lines of 
evidence in the literature support this conjecture. 
The first line proceeds from the widespread belief that our normative moral 
attitudes — whether or not they possess some further external justification — are just 
the sort of attitudes we would expect our ancestors to have evolved, given their 
usefulness in ensuring the cooperative and reciprocal behaviour greatly beneficial 
to members of a social species like ours (e.g. SINGER, 1982; RUSE, 1986; JOYCE, 
2006; STREET, 2006; WIELENBERG, 2010; BROSNAN, 2011). Our moral 
psychology, in other words, has survival value. But our normative linguistic 
attitudes, too — which mark the boundaries of social, ethnic, and national groups 
— would have had obvious utility in policing complex inter- and intra-group 
relations, allegiances, and rivalries; a utility which ethnolinguistics suggests they 
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still possess.12 So they too are ‘the sort of attitudes’, if anything is, that we could 
expect to have inherited from the earliest humans. Indeed, building on Axelrod & 
Hamilton’s (1981) classic analysis of songbird dialects, Daniel Cloud has argued 
that the complexity of human grammars — and the comparative ease with which 
children acquire them during the critical developmental window for first-language 
acquisition — may be adaptations “mostly to make it difficult for adults to learn the 
language well enough to sound like real natives. At some point in our recent 
evolutionary history, it might have benefitted us, as it does birds, to be able to 
quickly tell the difference between genuine members of our own tribe and 
interlopers” (2015, p. 110-111). And like moral norms, it is perfectly consistent 
where linguistic norms are concerned to think both that we are drilled in them at 
our mother’s knee, and that we have evolved to hold them. If it is plausible that 
our normative moral attitudes evolved, then it looks equally plausible that 
normative attitudes to language have.  
Anti-prescriptivists acknowledge that normative attitudes are part of the 
psychological make-up of language-speakers, but hold that they are drilled and 
inculcated into us from external sources. What the second line of argument 
suggests is that, as long as there is survival value to being able to learn them quickly 
and easily, such psychological traits may well originate externally in this fashion, 
but become progressively assimilated into the genome over many generations via 
what is known as a ‘Baldwin Effect’ (BALDWIN, 1896). More precisely, while such 
traits may be phylogenetically external, at least to begin with, they are 
ontogenetically internalised in modern humans. In recent years, evolution of the 
UG via such a mechanism has been independently proposed by several theorists 
to explain various features of human language (e.g. PINKER & BLOOM 1990; DOR 
& JABLONKA, 2000; JABLONKA & LAMB, 2005; ANDERSON, 2008; SZATHMÁRY, 
2010; ANDERSON, 2011; GLACKIN, 2011; ANDERSON, 2013; GLACKIN, 2018). 
Extensive computational modelling confirms the plausibility of these hypotheses 
(e.g. STEELS, 2011; SUZUKI & ARITA, 2013; AZUMAKIGATO, SUZUKI & ARITA, 
2013). Again, if it is plausible that the ubiquitous features of human language which 
form the UG evolved by this kind of mechanism, it is at least as plausible that the 
ubiquitous normative attitudes which humans hold towards language did so too. 
The first two lines of argument suggest that normative attitudes towards 
language could have become ‘hardwired’ in the human genome. The third line 
suggests that such hardwiring is not actually necessary for the overall point here, 
once we have come to regard such attitudes as a ubiquitous feature of human 
linguistic behaviour. Contemporary biological thinking is increasingly moving away 
from a ‘genocentric’, reductionist understanding of evolutionary processes, towards 
one that stresses genes’ conceptual dependence on environmental conditions, and 
the cross-generational transmission of non-genetic information and resources, 
including human culture (e.g. OYAMA, 1985; GODFREY-SMITH, 1996; JABLONKA 
                                       
12 E.g. “Once a nation or tribe splits in two, each with its own political organization, the 
two groups will seize on linguistic features as tokens of self-identification. A handful of lexemes 
and/or pronouns can be sufficient. The dialects of two new nations or tribes may well be fully 
intelligible, the important political thing being to take care to use certain words and to avoid others” 
(DIXON, 1997, p. 58). It is from just such a biblical story that the term ‘shibboleth’ is derived. 
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& LAMB, 2005; STERELNY, 2012). Chomsky himself (2010) has expressed support 
for this move, and argued for its applicability to the human language faculty. 
Accordingly, we can regard our drilling and inculcation in normative 
linguistic attitudes as part of our cognitive inheritance, which has shaped both our 
minds and our linguistic practices, whether or not any genetic hardwiring took 
place.13 Since vertical genetic and cultural transmission are equally legitimate and 
biologically significant modes of intergenerational information flow, there is no 
principled argument for excluding the cultural part of our linguistic inheritance — 
if that is, as Chomsky and his followers claim, “all” that our learned normative 
attitudes to linguistic practice represent — from biolanguage. 
We arrive, then, at the view that normative attitudes towards language, 
which are as robustly ubiquitous a feature of human language-use as any other, 
are therefore as much and as central a part of our linguistic inheritance as any 
other. That they are typically taught to us externally, unlike the supposedly “innate” 
and “automatic” operations of the UG, makes them no less natural or normal a 
feature of linguistic development; human language, both in its practice and its 
phenomenology, looks — in Wilfrid Sellars’ phrase — thoroughly “fraught with 
ought” (MILLIKAN, 2005, p. 79). 
There is one remaining move available, however, to anti-prescriptivists, 
which I flagged above; that is to return to the distinction between ‘language in the 
narrow sense’ (FLN) and ‘language in the broad sense’ (FLB) as Ludlow did 
previously (§1; LUDLOW, 2013, p. 51). That is, I-Language theorists might grant all 
of the foregoing, but nevertheless insist that these universal, inherited attitudes are 
still not, strictly speaking, part of language. Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky define FLB 
as “all of the many mechanisms involved in speech and language, regardless of 
their overlap with other cognitive domains or with other species” (2005, p. 179-
180) and FLN as whatever “subset of the mechanisms of FLB is both unique to 
humans, and to language itself” (ibid., p. 180). This subset, they hypothesise, is 
limited to the internal computational system which handles syntactical recursion 
(ibid., p. 203 ff.; HAUSER, CHOMSKY & FITCH, 2002, p. 1571), and would thus 
                                       
13 There is a further point to be made here, though it does not form part of the main thread of the 
argument. As Cloud has shown, complex informational resources, if they are to be reproduced 
across generations without succumbing to “error catastrophe” due to the accumulation of mutations 
(EIGEN, 1992, p. 20), must be accompanied by corrective mechanisms; since imitation has a 
particularly poor fidelity of replication, an informational resource substantially passed on in this 
fashion — as is typical of human culture (e.g. GRIMM, 2000; STERELNY, 2012) — is crucially 
dependent upon the awareness of the imitated party that they are being imitated, and their 
willingness to provide feedback by correcting failures of imitation. This explains a large part of 
humans’ capacity for culture, which is not shared by chimpanzees despite their cognitive resources; 
“Humans imitate a lot, and humans correct one another’s mistakes a lot. Chimpanzees and other 
apes don’t imitate very much; they mostly emulate, and they very seldom correct one another’s 
mistakes. This… must be at least partly because the fidelity of their imitations would be too low to 
avoid error catastrophe, and make imitating a good idea for the typical individual in the typical 
population” (CLOUD, 2015, p. 131-132). This insight, speculative though it is, provides further 
support for the first line of argument traced above; insofar as the conventions of human language 
form a complex informational resource to be transmitted across generations, there will be selective 
pressure for the tendency to correct linguistic “errors” — failures to replicate the convention 
accurately — in others, as well as to accept such correction from others, and modify linguistic 
behaviours accordingly. 
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exclude the normative attitudes we are interested in. That exclusion looks correct, 
as it goes; besides the possibility that these attitudes use the same cognitive 
apparatus as our moral attitudes, there is some evidence for precursors to 
normativity in animal communication (HAUSBERGER et al., 2008; LACHLAN, 2008). 
But this isn’t enough to show that human language is not, per se, normative, 
or that those normative attitudes are not part of the province of linguistics. In fact, 
Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky repeatedly stress that the mechanisms making up FLN 
are “neither the only, nor necessarily the most, interesting problems for 
biolinguistic research” (2005, p. 181). Again; “we don’t suggest that only 
phenomena in FLN are worthy of study” (ibid., p. 203). And most pertinently; “(w)e 
doubt that future researchers will need to make a point of distinguishing FLN from 
FLB at every mention of the word ‘language’, as we have done here” (ibid., p. 205). 
So the Ludlovian move of placing normative attitudes and the processes which 
produce them outside of language “narrowly construed” doesn’t thereby establish 
that they are only “pre-theoretically” to be regarded as linguistic. 
There’s a deeper problem lurking here for the FLN/FLB distinction, too. As  
I have elsewhere (GLACKIN, 2018, p. 174) pointed out, the “first motivation” 
(BERWICK & CHOMSKY, 2016, p. 11) for the introduction of the FLN as the true 
object of linguistic study, and the accompanying “minimalist” view of linguistics, is 
to reduce the explanandum for a saltationist theory of language’s evolution. Since 
Chomsky and his followers regard a gradual evolutionary process for the language 
faculty as implausible, that faculty must be such that it could be achieved by a 
sudden process instead; as small and as un-complex as possible. But if this 
evolutionary reasoning is flawed, as I have argued, then the motivation for the 
FLN/FLB distinction disappears; there is no good reason to accept the FLN as the 
proper and unique subject matter of generative linguistics — and to thereby exclude 
our normative attitudes to language from the province of the linguistic — unless 
one adopts a series of controversial assumptions about the nature of evolutionary 
theory. 
In short, what the Doge meme shows us is that the normative attitudes we 
adopt towards grammatical rules cannot simply be a set of learned particular 
prescriptions;14 rather, whether it is learned or innate, they must result from a 
generalised normative attitude towards such rules. And a general, ubiquitous 
normative attitude towards linguistic rules, whether learned or innate, could only 
arbitrarily be excluded from the province of language, and the subject-matter of 
human biolinguistics. Chomsky and his followers are certainly entitled to hold that 
such norms have nothing to do with their research project. They are right to point 
out, too, that much of the norms’ interest is sociological or political; but humans 
are, of course, social and political animals, and any comprehensive biolinguistics 
must take those facets into account. Prescriptive norms are a real and ubiquitous 
feature of language, and a real and legitimate object of study for linguists. 
                                       
14 To avoid any ambiguity; whether the grammatical rules themselves are learned or innate in any 
particular case, my claim here is that our normative attitudes towards them are not learned as 
particular prescriptions. 
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